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Hong Kong, a product of Britain’s desire to trade with China, has always 
been highly reliant on international commerce. Until the 1960s, this city-
state, comprised of an urban core and a small agrarian hinterland, was 
self-reliant in an essential commodity: fresh water. Since then Hong Kong 
governments, monopoly suppliers of water, have sought to balance re-
gionalism (an increasing reliance on water supplied from the Mainland) 
and localism (a continuing desire for water security).1 Since 1960, Main-
land water has come from a reservoir in Shenzhen, near the border with 
Hong Kong, and from the East River (Dongjiang ??) in Guangdong 
Province.2
The relationship between Hong Kong’s socioeconomic dependence on 
Guangdong and its administrative autonomy ignites considerable inter-
est today. The Hong Kong government, aware that the rapid economic 
development of South China has led to water stress in Guangdong, has 
sought to augment local water infrastructures in preparation for a future 
of climate change–induced droughts. But Hong Kong remains dependent 
on the supply of water from Guangdong at preferential rates, which civil 
society groups have criticized.3 Asit K. Biswas, a world authority on wa-
ter governance, has damned water management in Hong Kong as being 
worse than in “many Third World Countries” and one characterized by 
excessive waste, low consumer conﬁdence in the quality of piped water, 
1 The use of “localism” here captures a desire for self-suciency in water. It does not con-
vey a sense of collective belonging to a place, Hong Kong, or a movement for constitutional 
reform. 
2 Mainland China is deﬁned here as the PRC. Hong Kong government documents often 
refer to supplies from Kowloon and the New Territories to Hong Kong Island as being from 
the “mainland.”
3 Liu Su, Hong Kong’s Water Resources Management. 
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and an unnecessary reliance on imported supplies.4 There is an urgent 
need for historical perspectives on this situation. 
Scholarship on the history of Hong Kong water is developing fast, with 
new scholars entering the ﬁeld, including Nelson K. Lee, who has written 
a landmark study. Lee conceptualizes two periods of water management 
under late British colonialism: from 1959 to 1978, when Hong Kong de-
veloped an expedient trading relationship with the Peoples’ Republic of 
China (PRC) while investing heavily in the local water infrastructure to 
defend its position as a colonial city-state; and post-1978, when the Brit-
ish colonial administration, during a period of managed decolonization, 
prioritized regionalism.5
This chapter qualiﬁes Zardas Shuk-man Lee’s thesis in chapter 4 by 
arguing that mutually beneﬁcial exchange relations between Hong Kong 
and Guangdong were established in the 1960s. This is a routine trade in 
water that created strong path-dependent eects, locking in regional-
ism as a long-term solution to Hong Kong’s water problem. The chapter 
addresses three themes central to this volume: the socioeconomic inter-
dependence of Hong Kong and China; the impact of the Cold War that 
complicated regionalism, since the PRC did not recognize the legitimacy 
of British rule; and the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the British co-
lonial administration, which formulated and implemented public policies 
with minimal interference from the London government. 
This chapter begins by detailing water insecurity in Hong Kong. It 
then outlines water diplomacy in three stages: the initial negotiations in 
1960 to supply water from the Shenzhen reservoir; dialogues that led to 
an agreement to pump water from the East River to Hong Kong; and the 
disruption to water provision caused by the revolutionary politics of 1967 
in Mainland China and Hong Kong. Four subsequent sections explore the 
material beneﬁts and social and environmental costs of regionalism. The 
ﬁnal section concludes and outlines implications for today’s policy mak-
ers in Hong Kong. 
Water Insecurity in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong, for most of its history, suered from endemic water scarci-
ty because its natural hydrosphere was unsuitable for mass settlement.6
Large-scale rivers bringing rainwater from distant water basins and melt-
water from glacier-clad mountains do not run through Hong Kong. Lo-
4 Asit K. Biswas, “Time to Overhaul Hong Kong’s Water Supply System.”
5 Nelson K. Lee, “The Changing Nature of Border.”
6 L. A. Mills, British Rule in Eastern Asia, 479–484; S. G. Davis, Hong Kong in Its Geographical 
Setting; G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong. 
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cal geology also limits groundwater supplies. Unlike other parts of the 
Mainland, Hong Kong has never been able to use drilling and pumping 
technologies to tap abundant groundwater.7
The water authority of British Hong Kong, supported by the Public 
Works Department and other agencies of the colonial state, pursued a 
three-prong strategy to deal with water shortages. It invested in local rain-
water-capture technologies, encouraged consumers to practice water con-
servancy, and created a dual-supply network that used vast quantities of 
seawater for ﬂushing away waste and as a coolant for energy generation.8
Aided by the importation of water-intensive products such as foodstus 
and raw materials, the public water authority delivered a reasonable sup-
ply of clean water.9
Until 1960, the Hong Kong government had relied almost exclusively 
on the use of reservoirs to draw water from local water basins during the 
wet months, April to November, when 80 percent of local rainfall fell. In 
contrast, in 1971, only 1 percent of the people of Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon gained water for drinking from wells.10 Hong Kong’s people and 
industries usually did not go thirsty, but as systems for capturing rain-
water became ever more technologically advanced, supplies of drinking 
water became more expensive.11
The ﬁrst major local reservoir scheme in the postwar period was at Tai 
Lam Chung, one that was designed to end endemic water shortages by the 
late 1950s.12 A population explosion meant that this scheme failed to de-
liver water security, and in the mid-1950s the government commissioned 
a dam on the Shek Pik River on Lantau Island. This vast project, costing 
HK$200 million, was scheduled to increase local storage capacity by 50 
percent within seven to eight years. Within a few years, however, indus-
trialization and rising private auence (which increased demand for wet 
sanitation) had dramatically altered predictions about future demand. 
Government estimates of Hong Kong’s supply requirements made in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s had proved to be far too conservative. This 
7 By the late 1950s, for example, wells provided only 400,000 gallons per day, an insigniﬁ-
cant amount when considering Hong Kong’s need. See Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Letter 
from D. H. Reed (Colonial Oce) to Major C. A. Pogson [a consulting water diviner oering 
his services to Hong Kong], late May or early June 1963, CO 1030/1658. 
8 Ho Pui-yin, Water for a Barren Rock.
9 Kimberly Warren-Rhodes and Albert Koenig, “Escalating Trends in the Urban Metabo-
lism of Hong Kong.” 
10 A. Aston, “Water Resources and Consumption in Hong Kong,” 333.
11 Ho Pui-yin, Water for a Barren Rock, 17–47, 70–108, 151–182. 
12 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Hong Kong [Sir Alexander Grantham] 
to the Secretary of State for Colonies [A. T. Lennox-Boyd], 530, November 27, 1953, CO 
1023/199.
IEAS-Luk--text.indd   168 9/10/17   12:10 PM
Water Management in Postwar Hong Kong 169
forced the government to commission a colossal and technically challeng-
ing project, reclaiming a sea inlet at Plover Cove to create a new reservoir. 
This project, which cost HK$641 million, was scheduled to treble local 
water-storage capacity and secure self-suciency in water by 1970. Before 
then, water shortages were chronic.13 Hong Kong’s ﬁnal major domestic 
scheme was the High Island Reservoir, commissioned in the late 1960s for 
HK$1.38 million. It augmented Hong Kong’s storage capacity by a third.14
Hong Kong embarked on these expensive local schemes because the 
Cold War complicated the implementation of an obvious solution to 
chronic water shortages: building conventional reservoirs some distance 
from urban areas, over the border in Communist China. The next three 
sections explore how this political problem was overcome. 
ȱ¢ǰȱŗşśşȮŗşŜŗ
On November 15, 1959, the PRC invited three hundred guests from Hong 
Kong to attend a ceremony that marked the beginning of the construc-
tion of a reservoir at Shenzhen.15 On arrival at the site, these Hong Kong 
residents were informed that the reservoir would be able to supply a city 
of three million people for seven months of the year. In January 1960, the 
Guangdong government organized excursions to the construction site for 
the Chinese Reform Association as well as journalists from the Wei Pao, the 
Ta King Pao, the New Evening Press, and the  Xinhua News Agency.16 The 
PRC was sending a message to the water-starved people of Hong Kong: 
Mainland China could alleviate their suering.17
This development created a political problem for the colonial admin-
istration in Hong Kong. If the PRC’s message was the opening salvo in a 
propaganda war, how would the government respond at a time of water 
shortages in Hong Kong? The Great Leap Forward (1957–1961), which 
will be detailed later, was characterized by unsustainable development. It 
was fueled by propaganda, outlandish claims about the PRC’s economic 
capacity. Yet, private conversations between Hong Kong and PRC ocials 
13 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Letter from J. F. Saunders, the UK Trade Commissioner in 
Hong Kong (UKTC), to T. Sharp, Board of Trade (BT), July 22, 1960, CO 1030/1280.  
14 Nelson K. Lee, “The Changing Nature of Border,” 912–913.
15 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Extract from the Hong Kong Special Branch Report, No-
vember 1959, CO 1030/1280. 
16 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Extract from the Hong Kong LIC Monthly Report, Janu-
ary 1960, CO 1030/1280. 
17 Nelson K. Lee, who has used ﬁles in the Guangdong Provincial Archives, suggests that 
pro-PRC elites in Hong Kong ﬁrst propagated the idea of a reservoir at Shenzhen with the 
colonial government and with the Guangdong authorities. See “The Changing Nature of 
Border,” 909. 
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reassured the Hong Kong government that the PRC was not engaging in 
a publicity stunt.18 In January 1960, an employee of the China Resources 
Company, a PRC agency that organized trade between Mainland China 
and Hong Kong, approached John Clague, a director of John D. Hutchin-
son and Co. and an unocial member of the Legislative Council, and 
Arthur Clarke, the ﬁnancial secretary in the Hong Kong government.19
Formal talks soon followed, culminating in an agreement to connect the 
reservoir at Shenzhen to Hong Kong.20
Throughout the ﬁve-month negotiations, the British ocials in London 
and Hong Kong expected that the PRC would use the premise of “wa-
ter diplomacy” to augment its inﬂuence within Hong Kong. It was an-
ticipated that the PRC would use the negotiations to request a political 
representative in the territory and the resumption of through trains from 
Guangzhou.21 It was also expected that the PRC would launch a sustained 
propaganda campaign. As the event turned out, PRC negotiators did not 
ask for political concessions, nor did they exploit the propaganda poten-
tial of the agreement. Although two Chinese Communist Party–aligned 
journalists attended the opening ceremony, the Hong Kong Information 
Service Department provided far more comprehensive coverage of this 
event than the communist-aligned press in Hong Kong.22 The PRC did not 
even insist that the full text of the agreement be published.23
From the perspective of the colonial administration, this water diploma-
cy had been “remarkably cordial.”24 The provincial authorities in Guang-
dong had built a reservoir, proclaimed publicly that its water would be 
supplied to Hong Kong, and then opened up talks.25 This sequence gave 
18 Great Britain, Colonial Oce: Telegrams from Hong Kong (Black) to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies [Macleod], 35 and 61, January 9 and 18, 1960; Far Eastern Department, 
Colonial Oce, Submission to Ministers, Chinese Water Supply to Hong Kong, January 21, 
1960, CO 1030/1280.  
19 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Hong Kong (Black) to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies [Macleod], no. 40, January 14, 1960, CO 1030/1280. 
20 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Extract from the Hong Kong Special Branch Summary, 
June 1960, CO 1030/1280. 
21 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Water Shortage in Hong Kong, undated Memorandum 
for submission to the Minister of State, CO 1030/1655. 
22 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Extract from Peking Fortnightly Summary 23 for the pe-
riod ending November 20, 1960, CO 1030/1281; Telegram from Hong Kong (Black) to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies [Macleod], 882, November 15, 1960, CO 1030/1280.  
23 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Hong Kong (Black) to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies [Macleod], 867, November 7, 1960, CO 1030/1281. 
24 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies [Sandys], 2593, December 27, 1962, CO 1030/1281. 
25 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Letter from Maclehose to H. Stewart, March 14, 1960, CO 
1030/1280.  
IEAS-Luk--text.indd   170 9/10/17   12:10 PM
Water Management in Postwar Hong Kong 171
the Hong Kong government hope that it could gain additional supplies of 
water from Mainland China. 
In London, Foreign Oce ocials were concerned that the water di-
plomacy would have two detrimental eects. First, it might augment the 
power base of the PRC in British Hong Kong. Second, it might provide 
the PRC with an opportunity to raise the issue of Hong Kong’s sover-
eignty during talks about the exchange of water.26 Governor Robert Black 
(r. 1958–1964) of Hong Kong, however, disagreed. He believed that the 
political risks of engaging in the water diplomacy with the PRC would be 
low. He was vindicated. 
ȱ¢ǰȱŗşŜřȮŗşŜŚ
From 1963, the government of Hong Kong developed lines of commu-
nication with the PRC with the intention of securing emergency water 
supplies from the Mainland. In May 1963, the Hong Kong government 
broached the issue of new arrangements to bring water to Hong Kong 
with the Xinhua News Agency, the PRC’s de facto representative in Hong 
Kong. In June 1963, E. Wilmot-Morgan of the Public Works Department 
asked Tseng Shen?? (Zeng Sheng), the deputy governor of Guangdong, 
about the prospect of bringing water from the Pearl River (Zhujiang ??) 
and the East River to Hong Kong. While Tseng sanctioned the shipment 
of water from the Pearl River, the eects of which will be explored later, 
and the Beijing government had to approve negotiations for a deal to pipe 
water from the East River.27 This created a diplomatic impasse. 
In May and June 1963, the local Hong Kong press was reporting obses-
sively on what the government had declared to be a “water emergency,” 
a period of acute water stress that will be studied closely in a later sec-
tion. This pressured the government to act. On June 13, Governor Black 
requested that the British government approach the PRC government in 
Beijing.28 Progress on the East River scheme was slow. The arrangement 
to bring water from the East River was hampered by information asym-
metries. Hong Kong wanted exploratory talks to exchange geological and 
hydrological data so that it could provide the authorities in Guangdong 
with a detailed engineering plan. The Guangdong authorities, by contrast, 
wanted to know how much water Hong Kong wanted and over what 
26 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Letter from Maclehose to H. Stewart, March 14, 1960, CO 
1030/1280.
27 Hong Kong Record Series, Hong Kong Water Emergency 1963: Report on Discussion 
with Guangdong Authorities in Canton, June 5, 1963, HKRS 287/1/343. 
28 Hong Kong Record Series, Copy of Telegram from the Governor Hong Kong to Secre-
tary of State for the Colonies, June 13, 1963, HKRS 287/1/343. 
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period before they would open up talks.29 Hong Kong ocials suspected 
that the Guangdong authorities were hesitant due to the fear that if Hong 
Kong secured water, the authorities would back out of the scheme. If this 
happened, the PRC would have wasted scarce resources laying pipelines 
to the border. To break the impasse, Hong Kong ocials considered of-
fering to meet all the capital costs of the project incurred in Guangdong.30
In the end the Hong Kong government did not make this oer, and it is 
extremely unlikely that the PRC would have agreed to terms that would 
have symbolized Mainland China’s dependence on Western technical and 
ﬁnancial aid. 
Throughout 1963, public interest in Hong Kong about a new pipeline 
from the Mainland grew and pressure on the Hong Kong government in-
tensiﬁed.31 The colonial administration maintained dialog with the provin-
cial authorities in Guangdong and used diplomatic channels in Beijing to 
put pressure on the PRC. In November, Lo Fan-Chun (Chinese characters 
for name unknown), the vice-governor of Guangdong, met T. W. Garvey, 
from the oce of the British chargé d’aaires in Beijing. Lo conﬁrmed that 
a pipeline was under consideration and that Guangdong was “anxious to 
do its best for Hong Kong.”32 But in December, Ho Yin (Chinese charac-
ters for name unknown), a Macau-based “communist millionaire” with 
good contacts in Beijing, reported to the colonial administration that the 
PRC would insist on the establishment of an ocial representative oce 
in Hong Kong as a condition for a settlement.33 This would have been un-
acceptable to Hong Kong. Just when a deal began to look unlikely, the pro-
vincial government in Guangdong, acting “from their consistent stand of 
cooperation and help,” presented an engineering plan to bring water from 
the East River to Hong Kong without attaching political preconditions.34
Governor Black was so surprised and delighted by this “altruistic” act 
that he suspected the PRC would ultimately request a “worthwhile quid 
29 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Peking (T. W. Garvey) to Foreign Oce, 
435A, June 18, 1963, CO 1030/1654. 
30 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Letter from E. G. Willan to Garvey, October 3, 1963, CO 
1030/1656.  
31 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Black to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies [Sandys], 672, August 14, 1963, CO 1030/1655. 
32 Great Britain, Foreign Oce, Telegram from Peking to Foreign Oce, 882, November 
22, 1963, FO 371/170648.  
33 Great Britain, Foreign Oce, Letter from E. G. Willan to Garvey, December 20, 1963, 
FO 371/175908. 
34 Great Britain, Foreign Oce, Extract from LIC Monthly Intelligence Report, Janu-
ary 1964, CO 1030/1655; Telegram from Peking to Foreign Oce, 77, January 21, 1964, FO 
371/175908.  
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pro quo.”35 Garvey, however, believed that this was a “unilateral act of be-
nevolence” designed to enhance Mainland China’s image as Hong Kong’s 
“generous and unselﬁsh neighbour and protector.”36 Garvey’s judgement 
was sound. In 1964, Lo Kwan-hung ???, a left-leaning Hong Kong-
based ﬁlmmaker, shot on location in Guangdong an iconic documentary 
ﬁlm, Water Comes over the Hills from the East (Dongjiang zhi shui yueshan lai
???????).37 Three quarters of a million people watched this “box-
oce sensation” when it was screened in Hong Kong in 1965.38 The ﬁlm 
augmented the PRC’s symbolic power in the British colony, but PRC pub-
licity was muted. Its local activists were “torn between the need not to ad-
vertise this too blatantly and the natural desire to obtain maximum credit 
for their achievement.”39
Mark Chi-kwan has argued that in the mid-1960s, the PRC was play-
ing a long game with respect to Hong Kong. Ultimately it wanted to enter 
into negotiations to secure the transfer of Hong Kong back to Mainland 
China.  In the meantime, the PRC wanted to maintain “the status quo.”40
This required the embedding of regionalism. Friendly water diplomacy 
was the upshot.  
ȱ¢ȱȱŗşŜŝȱ
Between 1960 and 1967, rising imports of water heightened anxiety in 
Hong Kong about water insecurity. The provision of clean water was now 
dependent on harmonious political relations with a neighboring power 
that did not recognize the legitimacy of British rule. Ordinary people 
were acutely aware of the precariousness of this settlement. In February 
1963, for example, the state broadcaster in Guangzhou mentioned that 
if supplies from the Shenzhen reservoir “halted,” the “water situation” 
of Hong Kong would become unbearable. According to the China Mail, 
a Hong Kong newspaper, this announcement was a veiled threat lead-
ing to “widespread bewilderment and concern.” The Hong Kong govern-
ment responded by releasing a statement that it believed the authorities 
in Guangdong would adhere to an obligation to supply water under the 
35 Great Britain, Foreign Oce, Telegram from Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies [Sandys], 98, January 22, 1964, FO 371/170648. 
36 Great Britain, Foreign Oce, Telegram from Peking to Foreign Oce, 86, January 23, 
1964, FO 371/170648.  
37 Ian Aikten and Michael Ingham, Hong Kong Documentary Film, 57. 
38 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Hong Kong Police Special Branch Monthly Summary, 
April 1965, CO 1030/1657. 
39 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Extract from LIC Quarterly Intelligence Report, January 
1 to March 31, 1965, CO 1030/1657.  
40 Mark Chi-kwan, “Lack of Means or Loss of Will?,” 54.
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1960 “contract.”41 The reference to the “contract” was rhetorical. Governor 
Black recognized privately that the continuation of supplies hinged on the 
maintenance of good will.42
It was the revolutionary politics of 1967 in Mainland China and Hong 
Kong that provided the severest test of this informal arrangement. During 
the Riots-cum-Confrontation, local communist activists used strikes and 
violence to destabilize British rule. The colonial state suppressed unrest. 
The year 1967 also saw many water shortages. Rainfall was below aver-
age and Plover Cove was not fully operational. Moreover, as disturbances 
escalated, Hong Kong’s water security deteriorated. The PRC piped its 
contracted supply between October 1966 and June 1967, but relations be-
tween Hong Kong and PRC ocials, hitherto cordial, broke down. Hong 
Kong’s water engineers were mistreated. Meetings to reconcile supply 
arrangements were canceled. Payments went into arrears.43 When Hong 
Kong ocials, anticipating water shortages, requested additional sup-
plies, the provincial authorities in Guangdong did not reply.44 This had not 
happened before. Trust dissipated. Governor David Trench (r. 1964–1971) 
feared that the PRC’s strategy had changed. Rather than alleviating acute 
water stress, it would exacerbate it. He became convinced that the PRC 
would not miss a “golden opportunity” to leave Hong Kong in a “very 
grave danger”: “waterless.”45
The Hong Kong government responded, rather desperately, by con-
tacting governments in Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand about the 
prospects of shipping water from their rivers and reservoirs.46 Importing 
water across such distances would have been extremely expensive and 
push up water rates but would not have alleviated water shortages com-
pletely. The colonial administration admitted in private that only a com-
41 “Will China Cut o Our Water?,” China Mail, February 27, 1963, HKRS 545/1/38. 
42 Great Britain, Colonial Oce: Telegram from Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, 1098, May 27, 1960, CO 1030/1280; Extract from the LIC Quarterly Intelligence 
Report, January 16 to April 15, 1961, CO 1030/1280. 
43 Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Oce, Telegram from Hong Kong to the 
Commonwealth Oce, June 17, 1968, FCO 40/129. 
44 Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Oce, Letter from A. M. J. Wright (Water 
Authority, HK) to the Director, The East River, Shenzhen Water Supply Project, July 24, 1967, 
FCO 40/129. 
45 Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Oce, Letter from David [Trench] to Arthur 
[Goldsworthy], July 1963, FCO 40/129. 
46 Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Oce, Letter from R. B. Crowson (British 
Embassy, Tokyo) to T. K. K. Elliot (Political Adviser, Hong Kong), August 18, 1967, FCO 
40/129; Telegram from Manila to the Foreign Oce, 145, August 17, 1967, FCO 40/129; Tele-
gram from Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Aairs, 1301, August 24, 
1967, FCO 40/129. 
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bination of abundant late-summer rain and the resumption of supplies 
from Mainland China would negate the need for draconian rationing.47
It put in place an emergency plan to provide households with access to 
running water for only ﬁve hours per week.48 This would have put an 
unprecedented burden on the people of Hong Kong. 
Thankfully for Hong Kong, the crisis soon ended. Governor Trench’s 
prediction had been poor. Late in 1967, Plover Cove began to ﬁll with rain-
water, providing additional supplies. And crucially, in October 1967, be-
fore the beginning of the dry season, the PRC met its supply obligations: 
the Shenzhen–East River scheme replenished Hong Kong’s supplies. The 
crisis of 1967 had two eects. First, as Nelson K. Lee notes, it restimu-
lated localism: the High Island Scheme, Hong Kong’s last, great water-
engineering project was commissioned; and pressure for the implementa-
tion of a preexisting plan for an expensive desalination plant intensiﬁed.49
Second, the quick resumption of exchange relations—the PRC had only 
turned o the taps for three months—restored conﬁdence in regionalism. 
Yet, as shown later, what really made regionalism a compelling strategy 
for a ﬁscally conservative colonial state systematically underinvesting in 
the social and physical infrastructure was the price the PRC charged Hong 
Kong for water.50
Gains from Regionalism, I:  Cheap Water 
When water is drawn from distant water basins, capital costs and water 
rates charged to households rise. In Hong Kong, due to the PRC’s pricing 
strategies, high prices for clean water are a relatively recent phenomenon.51
In the 1960s, the price of Mainland water was extremely low. Throughout 
the decade water rates in Hong Kong approximately doubled; and they 
were to increase again in the early 1970s. These price hikes resulted from 
high capital investment in nonconventional water capture technologies. 
It was believed that imported water reduced price inﬂation.52 The evi-
dence for this supposition comes in the form of the price ratios between 
47 Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Oce, Memorandum for the Executive 
Council, Water Supply Position, August 5, 1967, FCO 40/129.  
48 Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Oce, Memorandum for the Executive 
Council, Water Supply Position, August 5, 1967, FCO 40/129. 
49 Nelson K. Lee, “The Changing Nature of Border,” 912.
50 David W. Clayton, “From Laissez-Faire to ‘Positive Non-Interventionism,’” 5, 8. 
51 Liu Su’s Hong Kong’s Water Resources Management makes the useful distinction between 
rising prices for East River water and, due to the subsidization of saltwater for ﬂushing, the 
low average per unit price of water. 
52 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Letter from [Sir Arthur] Clarke [Financial Secretary] to 
Harding, March 31, 1960, CO 1030/1280. 
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imported water and newly commissioned domestic supplies. During the 
1960s, water piped from Shenzhen and the East River was cheap, cost-
ing approximately HK$1 per thousand gallons, the same as the prevailing 
rate for domestic supplies, a strategy of “equivalent pricing” (see later).53
But the price of water from the Plover Cove scheme was predicted to be a 
third higher than Mainland water, and it was estimated in 1963 that water 
supplied by a desalination plant would be ﬁve times more expensive than 
Mainland water.54
Acquiring Mainland water was a low-tech and thus cheap solution 
to Hong Kong’s water stress. For example, the capital costs incurred by 
the Hong Kong government to link its existing supply network to that in 
Guangdong were small relative to those for the large projects documented 
at the beginning of this chapter. In 1964, Hong Kong’s Public Works De-
partment budgeted for HK$4.5 million to link the new East River–Shen-
zhen water scheme to the Hong Kong network. Most of this expenditure 
was for buying and laying pipes, installing pumps, and amending or 
building new pumping stations; farmers in the New Territories also re-
ceived compensation for the loss of crops and access to cultivated land.55
This expenditure was ﬁscally insigniﬁcant as it was only 1 percent of the 
cost of the Plover Cove scheme and 2 percent of the Shek Pik scheme. 
Before considering the hidden costs of this trade, it is worth ponder-
ing the PRC’s strategy of “equivalent pricing.” It is clear that during the 
1960s, the PRC could have set higher prices and thus gained more foreign 
exchange from its unbalanced trade with Hong Kong. In 1963, the colonial 
administration in Hong Kong was desperate for emergency supplies of 
water and was contemplating bringing water by tanker from Japan and 
Southeast Asia.56 PRC negotiators could have held out for higher prices. 
They could have let Hong Kong reservoirs dry out before making ﬁnal 
53 Great Britain, Colonial Oce: Memorandum for the Executive Council, Development 
of Water Resources, October 1, 1963, CO 1030/1656; Telegram from Hong Kong (Information 
Department) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, April 22, 1964, CO 1030/1656; Extract 
of a speech by the Financial Secretary [Sir John Cowperthwaite] in the Legislative Council, 
February 28, 1962, CO 1030/1279. 
54 Great Britain, Colonial Oce: Calculations derived from estimates in an extract of a 
memorandum [probably for the Executive Council] (untitled and undated), CO 1030/1280; 
and in an extract of a letter from the Deputy Financial Secretary, October 14, 1963, CO 
1030/1656.
55 Compensation made up 2 percent of the capital budget. See Hong Kong Record Se-
ries, Director of Public Works (Water) to Deputy Financial Secretary, August 12, 1964, HKRS 
287/1/348. 
56 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Letter from Willan to Garvey, July 30, 1963, CO 1030/1655. 
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demands.57 Why did the provincial authorities in Guangdong not bargain 
harder? 
Negotiations between Guangdong and Hong Kong followed a pattern. 
The provincial government in Guangdong would initially oer to provide 
water for Hong Kong free of charge.58 The Hong Kong government would 
then insist that any deal would be on commercial terms. At this point, PRC 
ocials would ask the Hong Kong government to set a price equivalent to 
prevailing prices in Hong Kong.59 The PRC pricing strategy did not reﬂect 
conditions of supply in Guangdong. All of the schemes to supply water 
to Hong Kong varied greatly. The PRC erected earthen dams just over 
the border that could be used to pump ﬂoodwaters into Hong Kong, con-
structed large-scale reservoirs, and built canals and dams to redirect wa-
ter from the East River.60 Prices did not reﬂect the dierent costs of these 
schemes, a typical feature of the Maoist economy.61 In Mainland China, 
irrational decision-making eroded incentives for investment in produc-
tive projects. It did the same in Hong Kong, eroding the case for localism, 
for sustained investment in highly productive (but costly) unconventional 
schemes to deliver water security. Instead it strengthened the case for re-
gionalism, reliance on low-tech communist schemes.  
Securing water from the Mainland was a quick ﬁx. Local capital-inten-
sive schemes took on average seven to eight years to augment domestic 
supplies. By comparison, in the 1960s the PRC supplied Mainland water 
within a few years. 
Gains from Regionalism, II:  Mitigation of Acute Water Stress, 
ŗşŜŘȮŗşŜŚ
The breakdown in exchange during 1967 was exceptional. Normally the 
PRC was receptive to requests made by Hong Kong for supplementary 
and emergency supplies. The main evidence concerns conditions aict-
ing Hong Kong in 1963.
57 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Black to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies [Macleod], October 22, 1960, CO 1030/1280. 
58 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Hong Kong (Black) to Secretary of State 
for the Colonies [Iain Macleod], 151, February 21, 1960, CO 1030/1280; Hong Kong Record 
Series, Hong Kong Water Emergency 1963: Report on Discussion with Guangdong Authori-
ties in Guangzhou, June 5, 1963, HKRS 287/1/343.  
59 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Hong Kong (O. A. G.) to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies [Macleod], 336, April 11, 1960, CO 1030/1280. 
60 Hong Kong Record Series, E. Wilmot-Morgan, Assistant Director Waterworks, Meeting 
with Po On County Ocials, November 26, 1963, HKRS 287/1/343. 
61 Kent G. Deng, China’s Political Economy in Modern Times. 
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In 1963, Hong Kong suered from an unprecedented weather shock 
(with rainfall of only 40 percent of the average) at a moment when the 
colony’s reservoirs had already been depleted. In the spring of 1962, with 
rainfall 60 percent below average, Hong Kong reservoirs contained water 
sucient only for a month’s consumption.62 And during the whole of 1962 
Hong Kong received three quarters of its normal volume of rain.63 By 1963, 
Hong Kong was in a “period of extreme peril,” the government having no 
choice but to halve daily household consumption.64 
In present-day Hong Kong, the average person consumes 130 liters of 
drinking-quality water per day, 220 liters of water per day in total, includ-
ing saltwater for ﬂushing.65 In 1963 and 1964, the ration was a tiny fraction 
of this level, perhaps as low as 30 liters per person per day.66 The precise 
ration was determined by the ability of households to prioritize the collec-
tion of water when the taps were switched on. 
Normally, in the 1950s and 1960s Hong Kong people enjoyed a 24-hour 
supply of water only when collected rainwater was plentiful; in 1960, this 
occurred on only 35 days. During dry spells, taps were typically turned 
o for twenty hours per day. During severely dry spells, consumers were 
only allowed access to water for four hours every second day.67 Rationing 
caused social inequities. Much of the burden fell on Hong Kong women, 
who, as part of their weekly work schedule, had to store water for drink-
ing, cleaning, and cooking, while those without indoor pumping expend-
ed considerable amounts of time queuing at standpipes, public toilets, and 
bathhouses. Except for those lucky few with access to private wells, priva-
tion would have been intolerable without supplies from the Mainland.
62 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Information Services Department, Hong Kong Daily In-
formation Bulletin, May 19, 1962, CO 1030/1280. 
63 The long-term norm is 2,254mm/year, calculated from rainfall data for 1920 to 1980, ex-
cluding the period 1939–1946. The norm is derived from Census and Statistics Department, 
Hong Kong, Hong Kong Statistics, 10; Hong Kong Blue Books, 1920–1938; Census and Statistics 
Department, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, 1970–1984.
64 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Extract from Governor’s Speech in Legislative Council, 
February 26, 1964, CO 1030/1656. 
65 Water Supplies Department, Hong Kong, “Calculation of Per Capita Daily Water 
Consumption.” 
66 This estimate was computed from the total annual consumption data that were con-
verted from imperial to metric measures (one gallon equals 4.55 liters), and deﬂated by mid-
year population estimates to arrive at a ﬁgure of 50 liters per person per day. See Census 
and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Statistics, 84. A. Aston estimated that 55 
percent of stored water was for domestic consumption, and so the ﬁnal estimate is 30 liters 
per person per day. See “Water Resources and Consumption in Hong Kong,” 229.
67 Public Works Department, Hong Kong, The Water Problem in Hong Kong, 5.
IEAS-Luk--text.indd   178 9/10/17   12:10 PM
Water Management in Postwar Hong Kong 179
During the early and mid-1960s, Mainland China normally supplied 
between 20 and 30 percent of consumption needs in Hong Kong.68 The 
signiﬁcance of Mainland water was greater during periods of acute crisis. 
In 1962, nearly 40 percent of Hong Kong’s freshwater derived from the 
Shenzhen scheme.69 The storage capacity at Shenzhen fell in 1963 because 
drought aicted the entire region. Shenzhen’s capacity fell by two thirds, 
and the PRC cut its exports of water to Hong Kong.70 Liu Su’s{correct 
name order?} claim that the “water stopped ﬂowing” during this “great 
drought” is wrong.71 The Shenzhen scheme supplied nearly a ﬁfth of Hong 
Kong’s needs during a period of severe water shortages. During 1963, the 
PRC also mitigated water shortages by agreeing to the shipment of water 
by tanker from the Pearl River. The “water lift” from the Pearl River, 603 
round trips to Guangzhou during the last six months of 1963, supplied 
nearly 1,900 million gallons, a third of consumption needs during that 
period.72
During 1963, half of Hong Kong’s freshwater was derived from the 
Mainland. Hong Kong ocials acknowledged in private that the Guang-
dong authorities had been “generous.”73 The UK trade commissioner in 
Hong Kong argued that the PRC had prevented a “disaster.”74 Governor 
Trench believed that the Shenzhen scheme had proven of “critical impor-
tance,” a boost to “public conﬁdence and morale,” placing Hong Kong in 
a “position of dependence on the Chinese which was never envisaged” 
when the original agreement was drawn up.75
In short, the volume and value of Mainland water during the 1960s 
made regionalism an essential component of Hong Kong water manage-
ment. As the ﬁnal two sections describe, this calculation was not aected 
by the social and environmental costs of the trade. 
68 Ho Pui-yin, Water for a Barren Rock, 217; Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong Statistics, 84. 
69 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from the Governor [Sir Robert Black] to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies [Duncan Sandys], December 27, 1962, CO 1030/1281. 
70 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Reuters Cable 052740, May 1963, CO 1030/1654; DIB, 
October 17, 1963, CO 1030/1656.  
71 Liu Su, “Hong Kong’s Water Resources Management,” 22. 
72 Hong Kong Information Service, “Hong Kong and China Sign New Water Supply 
Agreement,” April 22, 1964, HKRS 545/1/382/1. 
73 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies [Sandys], 912, October 25, 1963, CO 1030/1656. 
74 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Letter from Arthur Woller (UKTC) to M. S. Trenaman 
(BT), June 28, 1963, CO 1030/1655. 
75 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies [Sandys], 845, October 8, 1963, CO 1030/1656. 
IEAS-Luk--text.indd   179 9/10/17   12:10 PM
180 David Clayton
Costs of Regionalism, I: Labor Conditions in Guangdong 
The Shenzhen reservoir was built during the early years of the Great Leap 
Forward (GLF), a set of radical policies that contributed to a famine across 
the Mainland. The level of excess mortality varied from province to prov-
ince. The degree of commitment by provincial administrations to the poli-
cies during the GLF also diered. For Guangdong, evidence suggests that 
the authorities were committed to the GLF, which made its people suer. 
The amount of grain available per person in Guangdong fell in 1958, 1960, 
and 1961 due to crop failures and requisitioning, but Guangdong’s rate of 
GLF-related mortality was only 1.7 percent, compared to a national aver-
age of 5 percent.76
A key aspect of the GLF is the mass mobilization of peasants for water 
conservancy.77 Elsewhere in Mainland China, this activity contributed to 
famine conditions. Frank Dikötter has shown that water conservancy dur-
ing the GLF reduced the amount of labor available for agricultural pro-
duction and depleted the energy levels of construction workers, making 
them prone to malnutrition.78 At least 6,000 people worked day and night 
for one hundred days on the reservoir at Shenzhen. They also worked 
twenty-four hours per day through the rainy season to lay pipes from this 
reservoir to the border.79 Refugees from the famine-ravaged Mainland al-
leged that a considerable number of workers died during the construction 
of the dam.80 This scheme certainly exploited laborers.81 Nevertheless, it 
was small in scale compared to the vast schemes undertaken elsewhere on 
the Mainland. In Anhui, a province severely aicted by famine, the PRC 
mobilized ﬁve million workers to construct gigantic projects to prevent 
ﬂoods and improve irrigation and transportation.82
Costs of Regionalism, II: Long-Term Environment Damage 
Hong Kong was no dierent from other global mega cities that, from the 
nineteenth century, drew water over ever-greater distances. New York, for 
example, now relies on the watershed of the Delaware River, 125 miles 
76 Yang Jisheng, Tombstone, 325, 334, 396; G. H. Chang and G. J. Wen, “Communal Dining 
and the Chinese Famine,” 25. 
77 Judith Shapiro, Mao’s War against Nature, 69–70. 
78 Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine, 180. 
79 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Memorandum: Shum Chun Reservoir Water Supply, No-
vember 15, 1959, CO 1030/1280. 
80 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Extract from The Evening Standard, November 23, 1960, 
CO 1030/1280. 
81 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Extract from Hong Kong LIC Monthly Intelligence Re-
port, December 1959, CO 1030/1280. 
82 Chen Yi, “Under the Same Maoist Sky,” 205–206. 
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from the city, high in the Catskill mountain range. The problem for Hong 
Kong was that there was greater uncertainty about the credibility of its 
distant supplier—the provincial government of Guangdong.  This bred a 
short-term outlook. The British colonial state, as Lee has shown, contin-
ued to invest, for political rather than economic or ecological reasons, in 
the local water infrastructure, including a failed experiment with desali-
nation.83 As this section documents, weak regional property rights also led 
to adverse technological choice and poor protection for the ecology of the 
region, problems that ultimately aected the quality of the water supplied 
from the Mainland to Hong Kong.
In 1964, the colonial administration wanted to install a pipeline to bring 
water from the East River through Guangdong to the border with Hong 
Kong.84 Instead, the PRC constructed a pumping station to fetch water 
from the East River up one of its tributaries, the Stone Horse River (Shima-
he ???), and, via two other rivers and a new canal, into the Shenzhen 
reservoir. This open scheme reversed and widened natural river courses, 
created a network of 83 kilometers, and contained eight large pumping 
stations, six large dams, and 16 kilometers of canals.85 The PRC had maxi-
mized labor inputs and minimized capital inputs, reﬂecting prevailing 
product scarcities in its command economy. It was an optimal solution 
for the PRC.86 But during the 1980s, a period of rapid industrialization in 
Guangdong, the water carried by this open system became polluted.87
The contracts to supply water to Hong Kong in the 1960s were set up 
and run by the colony’s technocrats peddling engineering ﬁxes to com-
plex problems. Although these agreements became more sophisticated in 
later decades, environmental considerations were never given primacy. In 
hindsight, there should have been a long-term deal that sought to protect 
the ecology of the regional water basin. In the 1990s, New York, instead 
of paying for an expensive new ﬁltration plant, improved the forests and 
soil surrounding its reservoirs.88 By contrast, there was a rush for growth 
in South China in the 1990s, causing pollution levels to rise and leading to 
a deterioration in water quality. 
83 Nelson K. Lee, “The Changing Nature of Border,” 912–913, 916. 
84 Great Britain, Colonial Oce, Telegram from Hong Kong (Black) to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies [Sandys], 497, June 13, 1963, CO 1030/1654.
85 Derek Davies, “The East River Scheme,” 8–12.
86 Kenneth Pomeranz, “The Transformation of China’s Environment,” 136–142.
87 Liu Su, “Hong Kong’s Water Resources Management,” 32–33. 
88 James Salzman, Drinking Water, 57–69.
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Conclusions and Implications
As highlighted in Gary Chi-hung Luk’s introduction and detailed in Leo 
F. Goodstadt’s chapter, there was considerable socioeconomic interdepen-
dence between British Hong Kong and China. The post-WWII PRC sold 
essential commodities to Hong Kong at below international market rates 
in return for valuable foreign exchange. This unbalanced trade subsidized 
living standards in Hong Kong, and, by reducing the inﬂationary pressure 
for wage increases, sustained labor-intensive, export-orientated industri-
alization.89 As demonstrated in this chapter, exports of water from Main-
land China embedded mutual economic dependency during the 1960s 
and beyond. 
As Carol A. G. Jones and Zardas Shuk-man Lee show in this volume, the 
Cold War had a profound eect on colonial state building. It created un-
certainty about Hong Kong’s future status, which had a signiﬁcant eect 
on water management because the social returns on investment in the wa-
ter infrastructure required secure long-term property rights. As this chap-
ter has shown, the British government feared that the PRC would exploit 
Hong Kong’s dependency on Mainland water to augment its symbolic 
power within the British colonial territory. But the colonial administration 
was far less concerned about these political consequences; it perceived ne-
gotiations with the PRC to secure water supplies from the Mainland as an 
absolute necessity.90 This strategy, formulated autonomously in response 
to acute water stress in 1963, paid o: during the 1960s the PRC provided 
Hong Kong with cheap water at a low political cost at a time of consider-
able need. 
These nascent exchange relations suered a shock in 1967. The colonial 
state reacted to the crisis, most notably by commissioning a new reservoir, 
the High Island scheme. But 1967 was exceptional. Normally exchange 
relations were routine, and the day-to-day interactions between engineers 
and low-level ocials built up trust. An implicit understanding emerged 
that Hong Kong could secure cheap, clean water from further up the water 
basin. These were the foundations for regionalism. Although competition 
for water that ﬂows across borders is often predicted to become a source 
of international conﬂict, historically the type of cross-border cooperation 
described in this chapter has been the norm.91
89 For the ﬁrst scholarly account of this trade, see J. R. Schier, “State Policy and Economic 
Growth.”
90 For the latest ﬁndings, see Ray Yep, Negotiating Autonomy.
91 United Nations, Human Development Report 2006, 201–233; Steven Soloman, Water, 
384–416.
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The informal institutions that governed the Hong Kong–Guangdong 
cross-border trade, however, locked in suboptimal water management 
and led to environmental problems in South China. Hong Kong now 
needs local and regional institutions that create strong incentives for in-
novative human- and river-oriented strategies. The technologies of water 
management also need to change. The past provides an imperfect guide, 
but there are two, albeit general, lessons we can learn. Today, unlike in the 
past, institutions need to strengthen incentives to use low-carbon technol-
ogies in ways that will raise the “productivity” of rainwater and capture 
wastewaters. And whatever mix of technologies are tested (and these may 
include a return to rationing and desalination), the organizations govern-
ing entitlements to water today must, unlike in the past, be inclusive, rep-
resenting all end users of water. 
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